Reviews spams are prevalent in e-commerce to manipulate product ranking and customers decisions maliciously. While spams generated based on simple spamming strategy can be detected effectively, hardened spammers can evade regular detectors via more advanced spamming strategies. Previous work gave more attention to evasion against text and graphbased detectors, but evasions against behavior-based detectors are largely ignored, leading to vulnerabilities in spam detection systems. Since real evasion data are scarce, we first propose EMERAL (Evasion via Maximum Entropy and Rating sAm-pLing) to generate evasive spams to certain existing detectors. EMERAL can simulate spammers with different goals and levels of knowledge about the detectors, targeting at different stages of the life cycle of target products. We show that in the evasiondefense dynamic, only a few evasion types are meaningful to the spammers, and any spammer will not be able to evade too many detection signals at the same time. We reveal that some evasions are quite insidious and can fail all detection signals. We then propose DETER (Defense via Evasion generaTion using EmeRal), based on model re-training on diverse evasive samples generated by EMERAL. Experiments confirm that DETER is more accurate in detecting both suspicious time window and individual spamming reviews. In terms of security, DETER is versatile enough to be vaccinated against diverse and unexpected evasions, is agnostic about evasion strategy and can be released without privacy concern.
I. INTRODUCTION
Many customers post reviews on online commerce websites such as Amazon and Yelp. the opinionated reviews help shape product ranking and reputation, find consumers highquality products, and make products become more visible via word-of-mouth [4] . However, such a mechanism has also attracted many dishonest businesses to hire professional spammers to post ungrounded reviews to manipulate product reputations [11] , [24] . Customers can be misled to low-quality products, honest businesses can suffer from unfair competition, and the online commerce become less trustworthy.
To combat opinion spams, prior works have proposed abundant different detection models based on texts [17] , [11] , userbehaviors [17] , [29] , [5] , network structures [1] , [28] , [14] . However, more resourceful spammers can exploit information about the detectors available through publications, spamspotting guidance and detection websites 1 , to craft insidious spamming campaigns that can evade graph-based and textbased detectors [3] , [8] . However, adversarial evasions against behavior-based detectors have so far received less attention. This leads to potential vulnerabilities in spam detection systems that integrate behavior-based detectors.
Addressing this gap is non-trivial, however. First, a deployed detectors can be subject to adversarial probing and attack. 1 https://www.fakespot.com/, and https://reviewmeta.com/ For example, a spammer can gather knowledge about training data, features and models of the detector and engineer evasive attacks against the probed detector [20] . Also, diverse spamming strategies are likely to be adopted simultaneously by multiple spammers. These scenarios lead to attack-defense strategy asymmetry -the defense strategy is not optimal with respect to the actual attacking strategy, and a detector assuming a fixed evasion strategy [25] , [18] is more vulnerable. Ideally, a detector has to be agnostic of any spamming strategies, but the simple solution of blindly reacting to anomalies of any detection signals can produce too many false positives (see the experiments).
Model retraining can obtain unseen but probable attacks to hardened the detector against future attacks without assuming a single fixed attacking strategy. The key is to generate spamming actions to quantitatively manipulate detection signals under certain domain constraints. In the spam detection application, existing evasion attacks adopt closed-form or differentiable objective functions [18] , [2] , [8] , [3] . In malware detection, regardless of the target detector, direct manipulation and feature-sampling mapping were adopted, with domain constraints preserved [30] , [25] or totally ignored [23] . evasions against classification models [2] are usually Generated in the feature space without constraints from the application domains. Crafting real spamming attacks under constraints is not pertaining to the high-level detection models and is thus more fundamental and challenging. For example, an attack can post all 5-star reviews to boost the overall rating of a product from 2 to 4 stars, but the attack will have a detectable skew rating distribution, due to the constraint over changes in average rating and attack rating distribution. While genetic algorithms [30] , [25] can hypothetically modify previous spamming campaigns for evasion, the approach is not scalable and requires a known spamming attack which is usually not available.
To address the challenges, we first identify a set of detection signals [31] , [19] , [20] , [22] , [29] , [5] that characterize spammer behaviors. We propose "EMERAL", a maximum entropy model to quantitatively encode the spammers' knowledge, objective and domain constraints. By solving the resulting optimization problem we obtain an optimal attacking vector that further guides the generation of real evasive spams. The model explicitly captures the quantitative dependencies among multiple detection signals for realistic attack generation. The model is general, as multiple types of evasions against behavior-based detection signals can be included as objectives or constraints during the life-cycle of a product.
With EMERAL, we propose a novel defense, DETER, based on retraining, where training data containing possible future evasive spams are first generated by EMERAL and then used to train more effective detector without assuming a fixed evasion strategy. Based on the weights learned by DETER and the properties of evasion generation, DETER can be released to the spammer without security concern. Experimentally, the new defense is shown to be superior to any fixed single detection signals, simple signal aggregation and even ensembles of multiple classifiers trained on the same adversarial examples.
II. DETECTION AND THREAT MODELS
A review system has a set of accounts U = {u 1 , . . . , u n }, items V = {v 1 , . . . , v m }, and reviews R = {r ij : i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, j ∈ {1, . . . , m}}, where r ij is the review posted by account u i to item v j . r ij contains its text contents c(r ij ), its rating s(r ij ) and its posting time t(r ij ). We focus on detection model based on aggregated rating behaviors over time [6] , [29] , [5] , [12] , [31] : reviews in R are grouped into windows and for each window, detection signals are computed to obtain window suspicious scores. These window-wise signals complement detection on the review, reviewer and item level, and can help detect individual reviews [6] . We focus on spammers whose goal is to promote the target products' long and short-term reputation, measured in cumulative average rating (CAR) and current month ranking (CMR, defined as the ranking of a product, based on the current month's average rating [26] ). CAR and CMR are shown to be vulnerable to spammers' manipulations [13] . The demoting spams can be handled similarly by the proposed models. A. Time series based detection signals Normal review traffic shall arrive in a smooth manner while spamming reviews usually arrive in a more abrupt pattern [29] , [5] . Besides, to effectively promote product reputation, spammers also aim at lifting the average rating of the targets significantly [4] . Time series-based detection constructs and monitors time series to spot such changes in review volume and rating. A time series is a sequence of temporally ordered random variables x = [X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X t , . . . ], and x n m = [X m , . . . , X n ] denotes the portion from time window m to n. For the t-th window (we also refer t to the window or the timespan of the window), the signals NR (number of reviews) and CAR (cumulative average rating) can be calculated to obtain two time series:
where N t is the number of reviews ever posted up to window t. NPR is defined as |{r : t(r) ∈ t, s(r) ≥ 4}| and ∆NPR is it change in two adjacent windows. These two series can capture the large volume of spamming reviews and inflated average ratings. Changes in NR and CAR, denoted by ∆NR and ∆CAR, can capture the abrupt changes in the volume of reviews and accumulated average rating: ∆NR(t) = NR(t) − NR(t − 1) and ∆CAR(t) = CAR(t) − CAR(t − 1). The deviation of the actual time series value from the value predicted by a model that assumes smoothness of the series, such as auto-regressive models, can capture unexpected changes in the time series. In particular, an order d autoregressive model (AR(d)) predicts X t using historical data x t−1 t−d and a linear model θ (t)
The deviation of the predicted CAR ( CAR(t)) from the actual CAR, can be used for detection (only promotion is considered):
The larger the CAR-DEV, the more suspicious the window.
B. Distribution-based detection signals
A spammer needs to post a large number of positive fake reviews to promote the target. Thus if the percentage of positive reviews within a window is abnormally high, there are likely spamming activities. The signal PR (Positive Ratio) [22] , [20] is calculated based on this intuition:
where n t is the number of reviews within window t. Second, the overall rating distributions of the t-th window p(t) = [p 1 (t), . . . , p 5 (t)], with p i (t) be estimated by |r : s(r) = i and t(r) ∈ t|/n t , can be perturbed by spamming ratings and deviate from the background rating distribution. Such distortion in rating distribution can be used as for spam detection [6] , [19] , [22] . Let p = [p 1 , . . . , p 5 ] be the rating distribution of all historical ratings up to time t: p i = |r : s(r) = i and t(r) ≤ t|/N t . The KL divergence between these two distributions detects distortion in rating distribution:
The larger the KL-DIV, the more suspicious the t-th window. Third, define the rating entropy
If the rating entropy of a window is low, then the ratings therein are highly concentrating on a certain value while a normal distribution shall have a certain level of dispersion across multiple values [22] (such as a U-shape [9] ). A related signal is the change in rating entropy ∆EN = EN(t) − EN(t − 1). The window t is suspicious if ∆EN< 0.
III. EMERAL: AN EVASION GENERATOR
After discussing the threat model, we present EMERAL (Evasion via Maximum Entropy and Rating sAmpLing) to generate evasions against behavior-based detection signals. The resulting optimization problem allows effective and efficient evasion generation (Section III-D).
A. Threat model
A threat model captures what knowledge about the defense system an adversary can learn about and exploit to evade the defense system [3] , [25] , [27] , [23] . Abundant review data, including account and item profiles, review ratings and timestamps, are publicly available on review websites to all users, including spammers. For new or less popular products, less historic data is available and yet they have a higher incentive to spam. An evasion should be able to generate attacks even with scarce data. Obtaining labeled data is easy through multiple channels: 1) released review data are filtered before being made public and thus represent normal reviews; 2) Yelp further releases identified spams; 3) spam spotting services, such as Fakespot and ReviewMeta, release predicted class labels or probability too. Behavior-based detection signals are published with great details [20] . Fakespot and ReviewMeta further explain to users what detection signals are used to detect spams. Regarding hyper-parameter for detection signal constructions, we empirically show that the proposed evasion model does not require exact knowledge.
B. Evading behavior-based signals
A spammer needs to know the exact ratings of each of spams. We first find an evading rating distribution and then sample ratings from the distribution.
To evade KL-DIV, all ratings, including spamming and normal ones, in the current time window should have a rating distribution p close top that the defender considers normal. Specifically, let R ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 5} be a random variable of ratings such that p(R = r) = p r ≥ 0 and 5 r=1 p r = 1. For a target with many ratings, the spammer can estimatep i from the ratings using MLE. For the t-th window, the spammer can find p with minimal KL-divergence top min p KL(p||p) = 5 r=1 p r log pr pr .
The spammer wants to move CAR tox t from x t , where x t is the CAR at time t without spams. When targeting at promotional spamming, the spammer needs the manipulated CAR to be close to but not to exceed the targetx t . Let N t−1 be the number of ratings accumulated up to time t, n t be the number of existing ratings at time t without the spamming ratings, and n δ be the number of spamming ratings to be added. E p (R) = 5 r=1 r × p r is the expectation of R. Then the manipulated CAR after the attack is (N t−1 x t−1 + (n t + n δ )E p [R])/(N t + n t + n δ ) and the goal becomes:
where > 0 is a small positive number to allow slack inx t . In addition, the spammer can evade ∆EN and NPR by adding relevant constraints, leading to the following inequality-constrained KL-divergence minimization problem:
The first two constraints are derived from Eq. (3), and the third enforce the rating distribution entropy H(p) to be at least H t−1 + H δ to evade ∆EN (change in entropy). The constraint p 4 + p 5 < P ensures that after spamming, the ratio of positive reviews (4 and 5-star ratings) will not exceed P to evade PR (ratio of positives). The optimization can be solved using the Lagrangian multiplier method:
We can use gradient ascent to find the optimal Lagrangian multipliers α * , β * , γ * , and λ * . Evading EN is similar and can be done by settingp to the uniform distribution.
The above optimization problem assumes that the number of spamming reviews (n δ ) and the target CAR value (x t ) are given. We further set these parameters to evade ∆CAR (change in Cumulative Average Rating), CAR-DEV (Cumulative Average Rating deviation) and ∆NR (change in the number of reviews) that focus on abrupt changes in time series. By assuming that the defender adopts a degree d AR model θ to capture CAR deviation, the spammer sets δ t =x t − x t so that 1)x t is as high as possible; 2) |x t −x t | < to evade the detection of CAR-DEV; where is a small number and x t is the predicted CAR by the AR model. 3)x t+1 (δ t ) is maximized to allow a larger δ t+1 to be added to
Note thatx t+1 is a function of δ t since the next AR model θ (t+1) is updated onx t . Overall the spammer can
where U is an upper bound of the time series (U = 5 for CAR). Assuming the spammer mimics the defender by training θ using online gradient descent with learning rate η, then Eq. (7) becomes the following constrained quadratic programming problem:
The optimal δ is denoted by δ * t and is used to set x t = x t + δ * t in Eq. (3). The spammer also wants to evade detection based on burst detection [29] , [5] . We can add the constraint |x t−1 − (x t + δ)| < , to reduce ∆CAR. To reduce ∆NR, a spammer samples n δ ratings from the distribution obtained from Eq. (4), such that n δ is below the p-percentile of all positive historical increments in NR. To optimize δ, the spammer needs to know both the degree of AR model and the CDF (cumulative distribution function) of the detection signals on the defender side. We empirically show that lacking knowledge of d and p will not prevent spammers from conducting effective and evasive attacks.
Algorithm 1 EMERAL
Input: Reviews of a target; maximum number of trials M . Output: Ratings of spamming reviews to be posted. Select n δ and δ * t based on historic reviews. Set rating distribution: p5 = 1 and pi = 0, i = 1, . . . , 4.
if Evade rating distribution-based signals then
Use n δ and δ * t to solve problem (4) to find p(t). Exit without spams if no evasive rating distribution found. end if while Not succeed and number of trials < M do Sample n δ ratings from p(t) satisfying constraints δ * t . Return sampled ratings if no constraint violated. end while Exit without spams.
The overall evasion procedure EMERAL is described in Algorithm 1. EMERAL requires the target to have a reasonably long history of reviews to calculate the evasion parameters. Note that the algorithm may fail to find an evasive spamming plan for a window, and in that case, the spammer will not attempt to attack. Based on a preliminary experiment, there are only 9 combinations of detection signals, denoted by E1 to E9 2 , that are profitable for the spammers to evade.
C. EMERAL for early spamming: evasion E-A and E-B
It is shown that dishonest businesses have a strong motivation to conduct promotional spamming early on when their products are open for review [12] , [22] . We adapt EMERAL to generate evasive spams for such situations. A new product will have a smaller number of reviews for a spammer to probe evasion parameters from the CDFs of the signals. However, a spammer can leverage the CDFs of the signals based on the early reviews of other products and estimate the evasion parameters. In particular, a spammer can obtain NR, ∆NR, ∆CAR and rating distribution of the early time windows of all available products, and then tries maximize the entropy while satisfying constraints over NR, ∆NR and ∆CAR (E-A). Evasion E-B tries to post a maximum number of 5-star reviews to evade NR, ∆NR, and ∆CAR at the same time.
D. Empirical properties of EMERAL on late spamming
We use datasets collected from Amazon and Yelp [7] , [22] . To spam targets with long review histories, we filter products on Amazon with less than 1000 reviews or having less than 37 weeks of reviews, and restaurants on Yelp having less than 37 months of reviews (a month/week is referred to as a "time window" on the two datasets, respectively). The results are 383 products with 1175088 reviews on Amazon, and 327 restaurants with 247117 reviews on Yelp. The evasions are created on each target for the last 5 consecutive time windows based on knowledge obtained from all previous time windows (32 in total). We compute evasions with strategies E1 to E9, assuming that the spammer aims to keep each detection signal lower than the 80 percentiles of the corresponding signals' CDFs after the attacks.
We show spamming results on the Amazon dataset in Figure 1 (refer to the long version for the full results). The average numbers of total/negative/positive spams posted in all test windows by each evasion on the dataset are shown in Figure 1a . One can observe that all evasions post much more positive spams than negatives to promote business ratings and rankings. Interestingly, if a spammer decides to evade rating distribution related signals, as with evasions E5 to E9, some negative reviews have to be posted, while with evasions E1 to E4, there is no negative reviews. Since EMERAL does not guarantee that an evasive rating distribution can be found, Figure 1b shows the percentages of windows that an evasion is possible. Evasions 1-4 are successful in most of the windows (more than 70%) while Evasions 5-9 are more conservative due to constraints over rating distribution. Figure 1c and 1d show the promotions in the target's CMR and CAR per spamming review, averaged over all targets and test windows, on the Amazon dataset. We can see that evasions 5-9 are less profitable to the spammers as the promotions are rather small, and evasions 1-4 can promote the target rather effectively. We tried to evade other combinations of the signals using EMERAL but found them not valuable for the spammers. Figure 1e shows the ranking promotion brought by E4 after detection based on the spammers' assumptions is not much affected by the inaccurate knowledge of the hyper-parameter.
E. Empirical properties of EMERAL on early spamming
The early windows of the datasets that are not used for late spamming are used for early evasions. From the last two bars in Figures 1a, we can see that average numbers of total/negative/positive spams post in each early windows. There is no large difference in the total number, but E-A creates a small number of negative reviews due to entropy maximization. In Figures 1b, we can see that E-B has a successful rate two times of the rate of E-A, leading to higher per spam utility in CMR and CAR promotions, shown in Figures 1c and 1d . We conclude that early spamming is very attractive to spammers and advanced defense against early spamming need to be deployed, as we will do next.
IV. DETER: EVASION AGNOSTIC DEFENSES
In reality, multiple spammers can choose different evasion strategies and a spammer can change its strategy according to the defense strategy. We propose a defense DETER (Defense via Evasion generaTion using EmeRal) to handle these situations. DETER is based on defense model re-training [25] , [16] , [10] . For a target with long review history (with more than 30 windows), earlier windows (the first 30 windows) are used to train an EMERAL model, which generates 9 types of evasions on later windows (after the 30-th windows, group 1) of the targets. For early spamming, all targets are partitioned into two subsets. We pool all early windows (the first 30 ones) of the targets in the first subset together to train a single EMERAL model, which generates two types of early evasions (Section III-C) on all early windows of the targets in the second subset. Detection signals are computed for each window where an evasion is attempted. Labels are assigned accordingly ("spammed" (or "not spammed") if EMERAL finds an evasion (or fails to generate any spam)). For the two groups of windows with attempted evasion, respectively, the defender pools the labeled windows from all targets for all evasion types within the group to train a logistic regression model (using sklearn with the default hyper-parameters) to detect windows spammed with unknown evasion strategy during late or early review periods.
A. Effectiveness of DETER for late spam detection Suspicious window detection AUC is used as the defender's metric 3 . As two baselines, the defender can train a classifier using data obtained from each evasion type, and during testing, detect spammed windows by pooling all classifier outputs using the MAX or AVG function (denoted by EN M and EN A, short for ENsemble Max and ENsemble Average, respectively). DETER, EN M and EN A are all based on retraining and agnostic about evasion strategies, as opposed to w i , i = 1, . . . , 9, w a , w m and w r , which are only best for a single evasion strategy. Two randomized evasion strategies are created to confirm that DETER works without knowing the evasion strategy. The first one ("Rand1") assumes that each window is spammed with one of the 9 pure strategies with equal probability, and the second ("Rand2") assumes that half of the windows are spammed with Evasion 4, while the remaining windows are spammed with the other strategies with equal probability. Overall, there are 11 evasion strategies (9 pure: E1 to E9, plus 2 mixed: Rand1 and Rand2) and 15 defense strategies (9 pure: w i , i = 1, . . . , 9, plus w m , w a , w r , EN M, EN A and DETER), resulting in 11×15 strategy profiles. Rand1, Rand2, E5 -E9 are randomized algorithms and we report the mean AUCs after running each evasion and detection for 10 times. Evasions E1 -E4 are deterministic and only one experiment is needed. Due to space limit, we show the best AUC of {w i , i = 1, . . . , 9} (Best P).
From the table, we have the following observations. First, under strategies Rand1 and Rand2, DETER has the highest AUC than all the remaining defenses. Among the agnostic defenses, by averaging, EN A is the runner-up beating EN M, indicating that taking the maximum of the output is a reasonable defense but can be over-sensitive. Second, Best P is always better than w m , w a and w r , and we conclude that if the defender knows the exact evasion strategy, it can pick a single detection signal, rather than guessing using w r , which is inferior to DETER. Third, under E3, E4, E7, and E9 on the Amazon dataset, Best P outperforms all agnostic strategies (indicated by bold fonts with asterisks). However, such performances are based on the unrealistic assumption that all windows are spammed with the specific evasion strategies, and cannot be achieved in reality. According to Figure 1, E5 to E9 are not effective in promoting target reputations and a spammer is less likely to select them, although DETER outperforms or is comparable to Best P.
V. RELATED WORK
Opinion spams are different from social spams [15] , web spams, email spams in terms of spamming goals and detection mechanisms. Graph-based approaches leverage the relationships between reviewer accounts, reviews, and products for detection [22] , even with evasive camouflages [8] . Text-based approaches identify spamming reviews based on the contents of the reviews [21] . Behavior-based approaches [29] , [5] , [31] , [12] , [17] , [11] look for abnormal patterns in the volume and distribution of user ratings and complement graphs and texts based approaches. To the best of our knowledge, no previous work has considered evasion and securing behaviorbased opinion spam detectors.
Randomized defenses help to obfuscate the details of the defender and prevent attackers from taking advantage of any static defense strategies [27] . DETER does not need randomization for privacy purpose since it prevents the spammers from creating campaigns that are both evasive and effective.
Adversarial example can be generated in either feature spaces [18] , [27] or problem spaces [27] , [30] , [23] . Feature space generation usually admits a convex and differentiable optimization and adversarial examples can be efficiently found. However, the generated vectors may not be directly mapped to realistic examples in the problem space. Generation in problem spaces requires specific domain knowledge and usually involves more difficult optimization problems. Our work here is the first step towards efficient and realistic adversarial spam generation in the problem space.
VI. CONCLUSION
We proposed EMERAL against behavior-based spam detection techniques for both early and late stage review periods of the targets. The spams generated are effective in reputation manipulation and detection evasions, requiring only public available datasets and published detection methods. EMERAL does not require differentiable models or heuristic search. We showed that a spammer can only evade a handful of detection signals but has a dominating evasion strategy representing the worst case for the defender. We considered mixtures of evasion strategies, and devised DETER, an evasion-agnostic defense based on model retraining. Experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of both EMERAL and DETER.
